On May 19, 2025, the Superior Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia issued a significant order in Walters v. OpenAI, granting OpenAI’s motion for summary judgment with respect to a defamation claim centered on content generated by artificial intelligence. The ruling provides timely and important guidance on the application of defamation law in the context of emerging AI technologies.
Background of the Case
The plaintiff, Mark Walters, a public figure and media personality, filed suit against OpenAI after a third party queried ChatGPT and received a response inaccurately suggesting that Walters was named in a federal complaint involving financial misconduct. Walters contended that this erroneous output constituted a defamatory statement and sought damages for reputational harm.
Court’s Analysis and Decision
In granting OpenAI’s motion to dismiss, the court emphasized several foundational elements of Georgia defamation law:
- No Defamatory Meaning: Under Georgia law, a defamation plaintiff must establish that the statements at issue could be “reasonably understood as describing actual facts about the plaintiff or actual events in which he participated.” Bollea v. World Championship Wrestling, Inc., 271 Ga. App. 555, 558 (2005).
In this case, OpenAI successfully demonstrated that ChatGPT warns users that its output could contain factually inaccurate information. Essentially, the court’s holding indicates that it is unreasonable as a matter of law to assume that ChatGPT is providing factual information.
- No Showing of Negligence: Under Georgia law, a defamation plaintiff must demonstrate at minimum that “the defendant published the allegedly defamatory statements with at least ordinary negligence.” Am. C.L. Union, Inc. v. Zeh, 312 Ga. 647, 650-51 (2021).
OpenAI offered testimony from an expert witness demonstrating that it makes efforts to reduce and avoid mistaken output (hallucinations). The plaintiff failed to carry its burden of proving OpenAI was negligent.
- No Allegation of Actual Malice: As a public figure, Walters was required to plead and ultimately prove that OpenAI acted with actual malice—knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. The court concluded that Walters’ complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to meet this constitutional standard. Walters attempted to argue that OpenAI acted with actual malice because it was aware ChatGPT could make mistakes.
The court rejected this argument, finding “the mere knowledge that a mistake was possible falls far short of the requisite ‘clear and convincing evidence’” that Open AI was acting with actual malice.
- No Evidence of Damages: Finally, Walters conceded at his deposition that he did not incur actual damages. Because he did not seek a correction or retraction prior to filing suit, he could not recover punitive damages. And while ordinarily a statement accusing someone of committing a crime is defamation per se, entitling the plaintiff to presumed damages, in this case Walters’s own admission that he was not harmed by the statements rebuts any presumed damages.
Implications for Defamation Defense
This decision reinforces several important principles for entities defending against defamation claims in Georgia:
- Disclaimers and Cautionary Language Can Protect AI Companies: For liability to attach, there must be a reasonable basis for the reader to be misled. When AI companies proactively warn users that their models make mistakes and “hallucinate,” the AI companies may be able to rely on those disclaimers if later sued for defamation.
- Actual Malice Remains a High Bar: Particularly for public figures, the constitutional protections articulated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan continue to apply with full force, even in the context of new technologies.
- Summary Judgment is Available: When a plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege key elements—such as actual malice or damages—Georgia courts remain willing to dispose of defamation claims at the summary judgment stage.
Strategic Takeaway
Walters v. OpenAI is a clear reminder that traditional defamation doctrines continue to govern claims involving modern communication technologies. The ruling is an early warning that content generated by AI tools is unlikely to give rise to viable defamation liability under Georgia law.
At Berman Fink Van Horn, we provide sophisticated and experienced counsel in defamation defense, including matters involving digital media and emerging technologies. If your business or organization is facing allegations of reputational harm or needs strategic guidance in managing risk, our team is equipped to protect your interests with precision and discretion.
Katherine Silverman is a business litigator with a unique depth of experience in handling commercial real estate disputes.
